ABSTRACT: Using a unique sample of China's listed firms, we find that firms with strong corporate 8 governance are more likely to adopt the Cumulative Voting System (CVS) and CVS adoption improves 9 firm performance. Further analyses show that the positive relationship between CVS adoption and firm 10 performance is more significant for firms with less mutual funds' ownership, in a weak firm information 11 environment, and whose managers have more power. Finally, we find three channels -professionalism 12 of board directors, controlling shareholders' expropriation, and managerial entrenchment-through which 13 CVS adoption affects firm performance. This study enriches the literature on corporate governance in 14 general and the literature on the principal-principal problems in particular. Our findings also have 15 important policy implications for minority shareholder protection. 16
by which shareholders participate in corporate governance to protect their interests. In this study, we 36 examine the determinants and effects of the voluntary adoption by China's listed firms of a cumulative 37 voting system (CVS), which is designed to give a degree of control to minority shareholders and increase 38 minority shareholder representation on the boards. 39
Before 2002, almost all of China's listed firms used a straight voting system to elect their directors. to the number of shares s/he owns multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. The shareholder 50 may then cast his entire block for a candidate or may distribute his votes among any number of candidates 51 in whatever proportion s/he desires. Therefore, with the CVS it is possible for minority shareholders to 52 elect one or more board members even if a controlling shareholder opposes their election (Bhagat and 53 Brickley, 1984) . 54
The 2002 Code of Governance does not require firms whose controlling shareholders hold less than 55 30% of the total number of shares to adopt the CVS. That is, the CVS is optional for these firms. However, 56 between 2002 and 2005, 143 listed firms voluntarily adopted the CVS even though they did not meet the 57 shareholding criteria. 3 Using these firms as the unique sample, this paper examines the determinants and 58 Under a straight voting system, the shareholder has a maximum of 200 shares for each candidate (and 151 400 votes in total. With a CVS, all 400 votes could be cast for one candidate, or divided whichever way 152 the shareholder chooses. Therefore, it is possible for minority shareholders to elect one or more board 153 members even if a controlling shareholder opposes their election. 154
The ability of minority shareholders to elect "representative" directors is particularly important in 155
China. Although China has introduced independent directors to the board of directors and requires listed 156 firms to establish supervisory boards, the available evidence on the effectiveness of their monitoring 157 roles is mixed. Furthermore, China is a civil-law country where the legal protection of minority 158 shareholders is weak (Chen et al., 2009 ). Private securities litigation (PSL) was not allowed until the 159 promulgation of a specific PSL rule by the Supreme People's Court in 2002, but the enforcement of this 160 rule is often clouded by the dilemma of protecting listed SOEs and defrauded minority shareholders, and 161 by the undue influence of local government in protecting local interests . In contrast, 162 directors elected by the CVS to represent the minority shareholders have greater incentives to exercise 163 their rights. Minority representation on the boards may add independent critical scrutiny of controlling 164 shareholders-dominated firms and sometimes presents a prior constraint on illegal behavior, thus 165 enhancing the protection of minority shareholders (Feinerman, 2007) . 166
Moreover, concentrated ownership structures are common in Chinese firms, minority shareholders 167 are always passive and usually do not attend shareholders' meetings due to their limited shareholdings. 168
Even if they attend and speak at meetings, controlling shareholders tend to ignore them. However, if a 169 firm adopts the CVS, minority shareholders can elect "representative" directors and mitigate controlling 170 shareholders' expropriation. For example, Gree Electric Appliances, Inc. of Zhuhai, a listed Chinese firm 171 (Stock ID: 000651), adopted the CVS to elect board directors at the shareholders' meeting held in May 172 2012. With the CVS, the minority shareholders, mainly institutional investors, elected their 173 "representative" director and a candidate recommended by the controlling shareholders was voted out 174 (Liu, 2012) . This greatly encourages minority shareholders, especially institutional investors, to actively 175 take part in the corporate governance of listed companies. 176
Hypotheses development 177

The competing hypotheses on the corporate governance determinants of CVS adoption 178
China's listed firms usually have concentrated ownership structure. Controlling shareholders and the 179 management often possess excessive control over the company and seek to extract private benefits at the 180 expense of minority shareholders. CVS seems an effective corporate governance mechanism to protect 181 minority shareholders. With the CVS it is possible for minority shareholders to elect their 'representative' 182 directors even if controlling shareholder opposes their election. Minority representation on the boards 183 may add independent critical scrutiny of the controlling shareholder and improve the protection of 184 minority shareholders. 185
On the one hand, the CSRC has made great efforts to improve the corporate governance of 
The hypothesis on the impact of CVS adoption on firm performance 203
We then explore the impact of CVS adoption on financial performance. Agency theory (Jensen and 204 Meckling, 1976) suggests that a better-governed firm should have better performance and a higher 205 valuation due to lower agency costs. This prediction is supported by many empirical studies. For example, 206 Brown and Caylor (2006) find that better-governed U.S. firms have a higher return on equity, a higher 207 return on assets, and higher Tobin's Q. Sami previously state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As the ultimate owner, the state has the power to intervene 261 in the operations of SOEs. However, evidence has been produced that state ownership has not been an 262 effective governance mechanism in China and it contributes to inefficient monitoring, higher executive 263 pay, poor operating efficiency, and more acute agency problems (Gul, 1999) . We therefore expect that a 264 firm whose ultimate controlling owner is the state will attempt to maintain state control and be reluctant 265 corporate governance mechanism to protect the interests of investors, especially minority rights in China 278 (Wang, 2015) . Some recent studies provide evidence that independent directors are effective in China. 279
For example, independent directors are found to increase bank performance and asset quality (Liang et 280 al., 2013) , protect the interests of outside investors (Tang et al., 2013) , and improve internal control 281 quality (Hu et al., 2017) . However, there is also evidence to suggest that they are ineffective. For example, In addition, we control for the effect of the following firm characteristics, including firm performance 314 (Tobin's Q), 6 financial leverage (Leverage), firm size (Firm size), CVS imitation (CVS imitation).
Finally, we control for the industrial fixed effect and dynamic changes in the macroeconomic 316 environment common to all firms over the sample period, respectively. All continuous variables are 317
winsorized at 1% at both tails and all variables are summarized in Appendix. 318
The research design for the impact of CVS adoption on firm performance 319
Recognizing the issue of endogeneity in evaluating the effects of CVS adoption, we control for the 320 potential endogeneity between CVS adoption and firm performance by comparing a new CVS-adopting 321 firms (treatment firms) with a sample of matched non-adopting firms (control firms) with the propensity 322 to adopt the CVS. The primary benefit of using a control sample matched on propensity scores is that it 323 allows us to more clearly attribute any observed effects to CVS adoption itself, rather than to the firm 324 characteristics associated with the adoption (Armstrong et al., 2010) . 325
The propensity-score matching proceeds as follows. For each year t with new CVS adoption, 326
we include the new CVS-adopting firms in that year and set the dummy variable NewCVS to one for 327 these new adopters; we set NewCVS in the same year to zero for firms that never adopt the CVS 328 over the sample period. This completes the selection of observations for CVS adoption in year t, and 329
we repeat this procedure for other CVS-adoption years and then pool together all the resulting firm-330 years. We then estimate a probit model based on this sample. The determinants of CVS adoption are 331 the same as those in model (1). We conduct covariate imbalance checks by testing whether the means 332 of the covariates used in model (1) differ between the treatment firms and control firms. 333
We then use the DID method to ensure that our results are not driven by cross-sectional heterogeneity 334 between the treatment and control firms as well as common time trends that affect both groups of firms. 335
We determine one year as the comparing window for DID analysis. Using a short window in DID analysis 336 has two advantages: (1) the sample, by construction, purposefully focuses on adoption before 2006 to 337 avoid the confounding effects caused by the Corporate Law in 2006, and (2) using a short window before 338 and after CVS adoption in DID analysis can help reduce the confounding effects, making sure that the 339 treatment firms and the matched control firms are comparable; in a longer window, many firm 340 characteristics can change, especially in the post-adoption years. Finally, our sample includes 129 341 treatment firms and 129 control firms (258 sample firms in total). The observations in year 0 (the adoption 342 years) and those with missing data are excluded, remaining 493 observations. 343
The basic empirical model is as follows: 344 and CVS imitation, while negatively and significantly related to state control and Tobin's Q. Table 2 also  382 shows that all the correlations between the independent variables are relatively low. 383
To further test the existence of multicollinearity, we compute the variance inflation factor (VIF) for 384 independent variables and the largest is 1.84, well below the rule-of-thumb cutoff of 10.0 for multiple 385 regression models (Kennedy, 1998) . Thus, we conclude that multicollinearity is probably not a serious 386 problem in our study. 387
<Insert Table 2 about here> 388 Table 3 reports the results of mode (1). As shown in Table 3 , the coefficient on Mutual funds' 390 ownership is positive and significant, which suggests that when a firm has a greater proportion of 391 ownership held by mutual funds, it is more likely to adopt the CVS. This supports previous evidence that 392 mutual funds can play an important governance role in monitoring controlling shareholders and their 393 agents in China where a central agency problem is the principal-principal problems (Yuan et al., 2008) . 394 CVS adoption is positively and significantly associated with board independence, indicating that 395 independent directors are an important corporate governance mechanism to protect the interests of 396 investors, especially minority rights in China. 397
Multivariate Results on the determinants of CVS adoption 389
In summary, the results are consistent with H1b that firms with strong corporate governance are more 398 likely to adopt the CVS. 399
<Insert Table 3 about here> 400
The regression results on the impact of CVS adoption on firm performance 401
Based on the probit estimation, for each new ERP-adopter in a year, we select a non-adopter with 402 the closest propensity score in the same year as the matched control firm. To confirm whether the 403 matching is satisfactory, we check the covariate balance by comparing the means of the covariates used 404 in matching and report the results in Table 4. As Table 4 shows, there is no significant difference in the 405 means of any of the covariates between treatment and control firms, indicating that the propensity-score 406 matched sample firms resemble the CVS-adopting firms along virtually all dimensions. In general, the 407 results suggest that in comparing the CVS-adopting firms to control firms, we effectively control for the 408 potential endogeneity linking CVS adoption and firm performance. The regression results of model (2) are reported in Table 5 . After controlling for firm fixed effects, 412
we find that the coefficient on NewCVSfirm×Post in Column (1) with concentrated ownership structures, we accordingly posit that the effect of CVS adoption on firm 436 performance is more pronounced for firms in a weak information environment. 437
As financial analysts can reduce information asymmetry (He and Tian, 2013), we use the number of 438 financial analysts following a firm (Analysts) to measure the quality of firm information environment. 439
More analysts indicate a stronger information environment. 440
We divide the sample into two subsets: the subset in strong information environment with the number 441 of financial analysts above the median of the same year and industry, and the subset weak information 442 environment with the number of financial analysts below the median. We re-estimate model (3) with the 443 two subsets separately. The results are reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 . As we expected, the 444 coefficient on CVS adoption for firms in weak information environment in Column (1) is positive and 445 significant at the 1% level, while it is not significant for firms in strong information environment in 446 Column (2). A test of the difference in regression coefficients on CVS adoption generates a p-value of 447 0.069 (two-tailed) between Columns (1) and (2). The result indicates that a strong firm information 448 environment mitigates the impact of CVS adoption on firm performance. 449
The moderating effect of mutual funds' ownership 450
As we discuss above, mutual funds help pool the share interests of individuals, strengthens their 451 bargaining power and provides monitoring of a firm's controlling shareholders and their agents (e.g., 452 managers), therefore we predict that the effect of CVS adoption on firm performance is more pronounced 453 for firms with lower mutual funds' ownership. 454
We divide the sample into two subsets: the subset with higher mutual funds' ownership with the 455 ownership above the median of the same year and industry, and the subset with lower ownership with 456 the ownership below the median. We re-estimate model (3) with the two subsets separately. The results 457 are reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 . As we expected, the coefficient on CVS adoption for 458 firms with lower mutual funds' ownership in Column (3) is positive and significant at the 1% level, while 459 it is not significant for firms with higher ownership in Column (4). A test of the difference in regression 460 coefficients on CVS adoption generates a p-value of 0.001 (two-tailed) between Columns (3) and (4). 461
The result indicates that the impact of CVS adoption on firm performance is more pronounced for firms 462 with lower mutual funds' ownership. 463
The moderating effect of managerial power 464
Jensen (1993) argues that Chairman-CEO duality provides the CEO with excessive power over the 465 decision-making process and the scope to pursue personal interests at the expense of shareholders. This 466 duality compromises board independence and weakens its monitoring function (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . 467
In a similar vein, Lasfer (2006) argues that through their shareholdings, managers entrench their position 468 and weaken the monitoring power of a board. In a word, managers with more power tend to shield from 469 the monitoring from the board. Therefore, we predict that the perceived relationship between CVS 470 adoption and firm performance is more pronounced for firms with higher managerial power. board size, and board independence. We retain the first factor that explains 87.6% of the five variables 475 and use it to proxy for managerial power. A higher value of the index indicates higher managerial power. 476
We divide the sample into two subsets: the higher power subset with the power index above the 477 median of the same year and industry, and the lower power subset with the power index below the median. 478
We re-estimate model (3) with the two subsets separately. The results are reported in Columns (5) and 479 (6) of Table 6 . As we expected, the coefficient on CVS adoption for firms with higher managerial power 480 in Column (6) is positive and significant at the 5% level, while it is not significant for firms with lower 481
managerial power in Column (5). A test of the difference in regression coefficients on CVS adoption 482 generates a p-value of 0.007 (two-tailed) between Columns (3) and (4). The result indicates that the 483
positive impact of CVS adoption on firm performance is more significant for firms with high managerial 484 power. 485
<Insert Table 6 about here>  486 Taken the above together, we find that the positive relationship between CVS adoption and firm 487 performance becomes more significant for firms in a weak firm information environment, with less 488 mutual funds' ownership, and whose mangers have more power. 
Channels through which CVS adoption affects firm performance
490
Our evidence suggests that firms adopting the CVS tend to have better performance, as can be seen 491 from an improved ROA in Section 5. In this section, we seek to identify the channels through which CVS 492 adoption could affect firm performance. We explore three possibilities: (1) whether CVS adoption 493 increases the number of board directors with professional experience, (2) whether CVS adoption reduces 494 controlling shareholders' expropriation, and (3) whether CVS adoption reduces managerial entrenchment. 495
The professionalism of board directors may improve firm performance, while controlling shareholders' 496 expropriation and managerial entrenchment may decrease firm performance, therefore, these three 497 factors could be viable channels by which CVS adoption affects firm performance. 498
CVS adoption and the professionalism of board directors 499
Since CVS is mainly used to select board directors, CV adoption may result in the selection of more 500 directors with professional experience to a firm's board and an improvement on the professionalism of 501 board directors. As directors' professional experience helps them perform their monitoring and advisory 502 roles better, increased board professionalism should lead to improved increasing firm performance (e.g., Table 7 . 514
The results in Column (2) show that the coefficient on CVS adoption is positive and significant at the 515 1% level. This indicates that CVS adoption increases the proportion of directors with professional 516 experience and improves the professionalism of board directors, hence leading to better performance. 517
<Insert Table 7 about here> 518
CVS adoption and controlling shareholders' expropriation 519
As we discuss above, CVS adoption protects the interests of minority shareholders by increasing the 520 representation of minority shareholders in a board and mitigates controlling shareholders' expropriation. 521
Therefore, we predict a negative association between CVS adoption and controlling shareholders' 522 expropriation. Meanwhile, controlling shareholders' expropriation damages firm value (e.g., Lei Table 8 . 535
The results in Column (2) show that the coefficient on CVS adoption is negative and significant at 536 the 5% level (t=-2.11). This indicates that CVS adoption mitigates controlling shareholders' 537 expropriation, hence resulting in higher firm value. 538
<Insert Table 8 about here> 539
CVS adoption and managerial entrenchment 540
Based on the agency theory, managers tend to expropriate shareholders by diverting corporate 541 resources for perquisites and empire building at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ; 542 Jensen, 1989) . This agency conflict between shareholders and managers becomes more intense when 543 corporate management are entrenched (Pan, 2007) . 544
As we discuss above, CVS adoption is one of effective corporate governance mechanisms and 545 perceived to protect the interests of shareholders, especially minority shareholders. Therefore, we predict 546 a negative association between CVS adoption and managerial entrenchment. Meanwhile, managerial 547 entrenchment curtails shareholders' wealth (Jensen, 1986; Pan, 2007) . 548
We now examine whether CVS adoption curbs managerial entrenchment. As perks may be created 549 by managers to divert resources from the firm for their own private benefit (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ; 550
Yermack, 2006), we use abnormal perks as a proxy of managerial entrenchment. Following Gul et al. 551
(2011), we read through the notes to the section of "other cash flows related to operating activities" in 552 the statements of cash flows; for each firm, we manually collect the six items of perk expenses data. 9 553
We add the six items together to get a firm's overall perk expenses and then standardize a firm's overall 554 perk expenses by its sales (Perks/Sales). Finally, following Gul Perks/Sales i,t =γ0+γ1LnCompensationi,t +γ2Lnassetsi,t++γ3Lnincomepercapitai,t +ε (4) 558
where Perks/Sales is ratio of the sum of the six items of perk expenses divided by sales, Lncompensation 559 is the natural logarithm of total compensation for all firm employees, LnAsset is the natural logarithm of 560 the book value of total assets, and Lnincomepercapita is the natural logarithm of total income per capita 561 of the region in which a firm is located. We run the regressions of model (4), the residuals are our main 562 variable, abPerks6. Table  569 9. 570
The results show that the coefficient on CVS adoption is negative and significant at the 5% level (t=-571 2.57). This indicates that CVS adoption reduces managerial entrenchment, hence resulting in higher firm 572 value. 573
<Insert Table 9 about here>  574 In sum, these results bolster our findings and help explain the link between CVS adoption and firm 575 performance. CVS adoption appears to be associated with more directors with professional experience, 576 less expropriation by controlling shareholders, and less managerial entrenchment. 577 Further analyses show that the positive relationship between CVS adoption and firm performance is more 586 significant for firms in a weak firm information environment, with less mutual funds' ownership, and 587 whose mangers have more power. Finally, we find three channels -the professionalism of board directors, 588 controlling shareholders' expropriation, and managerial entrenchment -through which CVS adoption 589 affects firm performance. 590
Conclusions
Our study enriches the literature on corporate governance in general and on the principal-principal 591 problems in particular. It also has important policy implications. First, our findings suggest that in 592 countries where ownership is concentrated, CVS adoption is a useful way to protect the interests of 593 minority shareholders, because it reduces controlling shareholders' expropriation and managerial 594 entrenchment. Second, in China, a further reduction of the influence of controlling shareholders over 595 listed firms could be considered so as to limit the expropriation by controlling shareholders, thus 596 improving investor protection. 
